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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. Following the unprecedented political violence that engulfed Kenya after the disputed 2007 
General Election, international mediation by the African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities under the Chairmanship of Mr. Kofi Annan saw the Government/Party 
of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) agree to undertake 
several actions. These actions were aimed at stopping the violence and ending the political 
crisis. The agreements were signed under the auspices of the Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation (KNDR) forum. 
2. This report is the first review report for 2010. It examines progress made in implementing 
the KNDR agreements in the period between January and March 2010.  Previous report for 
2008 and 2009 are found at www.dialoguekenya.org. These reports have the 
accomplishments and challenges faced in implementing reforms. The reports have also 
noted that the reform agenda itself has been ambitious and that expectations have been 
high.  This report is based on data collected using a mix of methods including a national 
survey carried out across the country during the in January and February 2010 as well as 
interviews with key informants who have knowledge of the various agenda items. This data 
has helped in comparing major trends since 2008. In addition, the report has used 
secondary sources of information. 
Findings  
3. Illegal armed groups not politically active: Between January and March 2010, there was a 
lull in the activities of illegal armed groups. These groups are neither politically active nor 
involved in political violence. Calm has returned, therefore, even in areas where the groups 
were visibly active. The lull in their activities is attributable to several factors, including 
transformation of some groups into criminal extortion gangs. Others are shedding their 
negative image in readiness to play political roles in the forthcoming electoral period. An 
important finding also is that the public do not seek protection from these groups out of 
preference but out of necessity. The public do not support the existence of these groups and 
instead prefer protection from the police. This suggests a need to fast track reforms to make 
the police accountable.  
 
4. The public supports prosecution of perpetrators of violence: The public generally supports 
the prosecution of the leaders of illegally armed groups. They would also prefer to see the 
perpetrators of post-election violence prosecuted, regardless of their ethnic identity. In this 
regard, people are generally supportive of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
intervention in investigating and, perhaps prosecuting the perpetrators of post-election 
violence. Unfortunately, the ICC progress in pursuing the Kenya case has inadvertently 
produced an escalation in threats to potential witnesses. Deaths, threats, and intimidation of 
potential witnesses have forced many witnesses into hiding locally or abroad. The absence of 
a functional witness protection programme has made it difficult for some of the witnesses to 
remain in the country. As noted in the past, a programme under the watch of human rights 
defenders and the international community/organisations is imperative.  
 
5. The plight of IDPs slipping off the agenda: The significance of the plight of the Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) and continued existence of some in camps continues to recede. 
Only a few institutions and individuals are attempting to articulate the need to focus on the 
plight of IDPs as a national agenda. There are still incidents of Government officials forcibly 
evicting IDPs from some of the camps they occupy. The Government has finalised a draft 
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IDP policy, which, it is hoped, will help to deliver a lasting solution to the IDP problem and 
also provide strategies for resettlement. It is important that a rights-based approach is 
adopted in addressing their concerns. Participation of IDPs, openness and a high sense of 
accountability should be the guiding principles in resolving their problems. Related to this is 
the question of healing and reconciliation. Systematic approaches to healing and 
reconciliation must be identified. Similarly, there is need to fast track enactment and 
enforcement of laws to support initiatives towards healing and reconciliation. Hate Speech 
Bill, Freedom of Information, and Equal Opportunities and Equality Bills are relevant in this 
respect.  
 
6. Lack of cohesion in the Coalition Government remains a problem:  Disunity within the 
Coalition Government remains a major sticking point. It affects Government operations and 
stalls important reforms. For instance, the Cabinet did not meet between early February and 
mid-March, thereby delaying Cabinet decisions on several issues. Partly responsible for this 
are the different approaches the two parties pursued in the fight against corruption. It is 
ironic that the approach to the fight against corruption is also causing disunity within the 
Coalition. It is being turned into a cause of division along ethnic lines because some leaders 
hide behind claims of ethnic targeting to defend themselves against allegations of 
corruption.  
 
7. The Coalition Government still lacks an effective mechanism for resolving disputes. 
Without a clear mechanism for resolving disputes, compounded by the lack of a framework 
to guide the parties operations within the Coalition, the running of the Government is 
dependent on ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ and the goodwill of the two Principals. Further, in 
the absence of structured mechanisms for consultations, partisan interests are increasingly 
undermining the making of decisions within the Coalition and preventing the promotion of 
the greater interests of the nation. As noted in the past, informing these differences is the 
unresolved issue of power sharing. There are still disagreements on who has what power and 
whether or not power should be or is shared equally. It appears to escape the parties that 
power sharing is about helping them to unite for the purpose of delivering reforms for the 
country.  
 
8. The window for reforms before the referendum has shut – only a new constitution can 
open opportunities for radical reforms: a number of important initiatives have been taken 
with respect to Agenda Item 4. However, there are certain important reforms that should 
have been undertaken to date but have not. The window of opportunity for undertaking any 
important reforms before the referendum on a new constitution has now closed. But the 
draft constitution has a huge potential to open new windows for reforms. There is a need, 
therefore, to ensure adequate preparedness to immediately undertake reforms after the 
referendum.  
 
9. Judicial and police reforms should be a priority: Judicial and police reforms, whose 
elaborate framework for implementation is already laid out, should be prioritized in 
readiness for the 2012 general elections. Priority reform areas include particularly those 
aspects that directly relate to achieving credible elections, a democratic environment, and 
accountable institutions. As suggested by the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV), insulating the police from political interference and ethnic manipulation 
as well as establishing judicial organs to fast-track resolution of electoral disputes are 
priorities. 
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10. Electronic voter registration and electronic voting system should be prioritised: 
Registration of voters has been going on and opinion polls show that the voter turnout in the 
referendum for the proposed new constitution is likely to be high. The voter register is being 
rebuilt afresh. The credibility of the outcome of the referendum will depend on the number 
of registered voters and the integrity of the voting process. Electronic voter registration will 
certainly enhance the integrity of the voting system and reduce the costs associated with 
manual registration and voting. Because of this, IIEC should be supported to transparently 
establish a framework for an electronic voting system. The Commission should also be 
supported to implement electronic voter registration in all the constituencies – of course 
depending on the outcome of the pilot phase. An immediate priority should be intense public 
education campaigns to ensure that many eligible voters are registered before the 
referendum. And because a national infrastructure to support e-registration and e-voting is 
in place, evidenced especially by use of mobile telephony and a broad GSM coverage, the 
Commission should embark on establishing an electronic system to support e-registration 
and e-voting for the 2012 General Election and before the interim Commission winds up its 
activities.  
 
11. A new constitution will open opportunities for far reaching reforms:  The proposed new 
constitution has passed some of the most important hurdles.  If passed at the referendum 
and implemented, the proposed constitution has the potential to extensively change the 
framework of governance and politics in Kenya. It will transform the state and its 
institutions in a number of important ways. It will open a new window to undertake even 
more far-reaching changes in the country. There is a need therefore for vigilance over the 
review by all Kenyans desirous of achieving change to ensure that it remains on track and 
safe from the sectarian threats that are coalescing around perceived unresolved issues.  
 
12. Public attention is shifting away from radical reforms to single issues: The debate on what 
are considered by some as unresolved issues has distracted attention away from what have 
been demands for a new constitution, which are to reform the state and its institutions. The 
country is not debating how this constitutional moment should lead to comprehensive and 
radical reform of the state, its institutions, and the society itself and enable the country to 
prevent the reoccurrence of violent conflict. It is an irony that sections of the Christian 
church appear poised to abandon their traditional position as some of the strongest 
champions for a new constitution, because of what they consider as contentious issues in the 
draft constitution.  
 
13. The opportunity to have a new constitution is a rare one in any society. Kenya’s is a rare 
opportunity and should not be allowed to go to waste. It is important that strategies be 
devised to address these challenges and refocus the public debate towards the greater 
national interest in constitutional reform.  
 
14. Unity of purpose is a requisite: The spirit of cooperation and partnership embedded in the 
National Accord should guide the country in these final stages of the constitutional review. 
The two Principals will have to show unity of purpose to ensure effective decision-making 
within the Coalition Government. Cooperation and unity between the two Principals and 
their allies is required to guide the country after the referendum and into the next General 
Election. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. This report reviews the implementation of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
(KNDR) Agreements resulting from mediation by the African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities under the chairmanship of Mr Kofi Annan. Under these agreements, 
the two main parties – the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Party 
(ODM) – agreed on a number of steps to address the crisis that engulfed the country after 
the disputed December 2007 General Election. 
2. The parties committed to undertake a set of actions to achieve the goal of the KNDR: 
Achieving sustainable peace, stability and justice through rule of law and respect for human 
rights. 
3. Previous reports are found at www.dialoguekenya.org. This report covers the period between 
January and March 2010.  
4. A mix of methods was used to collect data for this report. The research team interviewed 
various respondents, among them, key informants in government ministries, humanitarian 
agencies, civil society organisations and the media. The report has used secondary sources of 
information, including reports by the government, humanitarian agencies as well as the 
media. The report has cautiously used secondary data, with corroboration through primary 
data sources informing the extent to which some of the findings are integrated into the 
review.  
5. Finally, the report is based on a national survey. The survey was carried out during the last 
week of January and first week of February 2010. The sample size for the survey was 2500 
people. It was a nation wide survey carried out in all the eight provinces and in sixty-three 
districts. 
6. The review has taken care to remain objective and to let the data set speak for itself, knowing 
full well that analysis of progress is sensitive to political interests and realities. The research 
team interviewed various respondents with knowledge on the various agenda items. In 
addition, a national survey was conducted to assess the prevailing situation.  
7. The report is divided into sections corresponding to the agenda items under the KNDR 
agreement.  
(a) Section 2:  Agenda Item 1 on actions to end violence and restore fundamental rights.  
(b) Section 3: Agenda Item 2 – Addressing the humanitarian crisis and promoting 
healing and reconciliation.  
(c) Section 4 discusses Agenda Item 3 on power sharing, which was agreed upon as a 
means of ending the political crisis.  
(d) Section 5 discusses Agenda Item 4 on addressing long-standing issues.  
(e) Section 6 reiterates some conclusions based on the main findings. 
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2. AGENDA ITEM 1: IMMEDIATE ACTION TO STOP VIOLENCE AND 
RESTORE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
 
Introduction 
8. Agenda 1 of the KNDR Agreements sought to halt the violence and restore fundamental 
rights and liberties. It outlined measures the police, the public, political leaders and the 
media were to take to achieve this goal. In addition, Agenda 1 outlined measures to facilitate 
and protect peaceful assembly as well as impartial and expeditious investigations into the 
violence. The mediation team also called for the development of a suitable code of conduct 
for journalists in consultation with the Media Council.  
9. This review report outlines the progress made in implementing Agenda 1 in the period 
between January and March 2010. It draws data from primary and secondary sources 
through interviews, Focus Group Discussions, and a national survey.  
Key findings 
Summary of findings 
• A committee is appointed to oversee implementation of Police Reforms 
• Kenya Communications (Broadcasting) Regulations 2009 come into force 
• Government recovers and destroys 2,545 illegal firearms 
• There is a lull in militia activity  
• Cache of arms found in Narok, and allegations of stockpiling of arms raise 
concern 
• Acrimonious boundary disputes increase as Boundaries’ Commission visits 
districts 
• The ICC makes progress on the Kenyan case and threats against witnesses 
increase  
• There is a resurgence of extra-judicial killings; impunity continues  
• Freedom of assembly is not fully restored; it is constrained  
Halting political violence 
10. The previous report noted that calm returned to all affected areas affected by the violence. 
This has helped Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to return to their residences or near 
their farms. Significant also is the increasing confidence among citizens that violence will 
not reoccur.  
11. A point to stress during this quarter is that the absence of political violence has helped 
people to develop a sense of safety compared to early 2008. According to the survey carried 
out in January/February 2010, 58 per cent of respondents feel safer, while 23per cent feel 
about the same and 19 per cent feel less safe. Overall, however, the proportion of 
respondents who feel safer has gone up by 6per cent between the August 2009 and the 
February 2010 surveys, while the percentage of those who feel less safe has declined by 8per 
cent.  
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Table 1: Thinking about your safety now compared to six months ago do you feel safer, less safe, 
or about the same? (Comparison of surveys) 
 August ‘09 January ‘10 
Safer 52% 58% 
About the same 20% 23% 
Less safe 27% 19% 
12. Although these figures are an improvement on those for early 2008 during the political 
violence, a majority of the population should be feeling safer. That not everyone is feeling 
safer is a cause of concern. It is testimony that the conditions giving rise to insecurity are yet 
to be fully addressed.   
13. Insecurity in the slums of Nairobi leads to community self-defence groups: Past reports 
highlighted increasing insecurity in some parts of the country and urban areas in particular. 
Findings now show that poor security and ineffectiveness of the police has led to 
communities in the slums forming self-defence groups. In Kibera, for instance, recurrent 
inter-ethnic violence has motivated different ethnic groups to form ‘self defence units’ to 
protect their members. They resort to these groups because police take a long time to 
investigate and rarely secure convictions.  
14. Communities in the poor slums are highly ethnicised: The findings also show that local 
communities in the slums are so ethnicisied that inter-personal quarrels usually transform 
into conflict between ethnic groups.2 The community self-defence units, however, play a role 
in mediating these disputes. This is not to suggest, however, that people have confidence in 
these groups. They only turn to them as a last resort. As noted in the past reports, slow 
progress in healing and reconciliation accounts for heightened acrimony between groups.  
15. Claims of stock piling of arms in Rift Valley are a major concern: Local discourses and 
media reports about stock piling of arms by rival communities in Rift Valley continue to 
draw attention. In December 2009 and February 2010, a large cache of assorted weapons 
and over 130,000 rounds of ammunition were discovered in Narok town in the Rift Valley, 
the province most affected by the post-election violence.3 Some of the ammunitions and 
weapons were reportedly traced to the Government armoury and Government bullet factory 
in Eldoret. This is an issue of concern because it points to possible complicity of some 
officials in the matter.4 The Government has begun investigations on some officials involved 
in gun-running cartels and some have been discipline while others including those 
implicated in the cache of arm are awaiting prosecution.  
16. Arms and transition politics are an issue of concern: The rounds of ammunition uncovered 
in this instance suggest that the intended use was not merely criminal activities. Coming at a 
time when the country is in the grip of transition politics, and without resolving all the 
circumstances that contributed to the post-2007 election violence context, allegations of 
stockpiling of arms are worrisome. These developments should be keenly watched as the 
country approaches the election period and transition. Transition politics concern loss of 
political power and influence for some, and acquisition of power and influence by others. 
The precedents in transition politics in Kenya make this an issue of concern. Illegal militia 
                                                 
2
 Interview with a member of Community Policing in Kibera, 18 March, 2010  
3
 Interview with a senior government official, 23 Feb 2010; media reports 19 Feb 2010 
4
 Interview with a security expert in Nairobi, 7 March 2010  
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and even formal security can be constituted and equipped to help the politics along.5 The 
Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (Waki Commission) identified 
perceptions of politicisation of the Administration Police as an issue requiring attention 
through police sector reforms. 
17. Disarmament and recovery of illegal weapons continues: The Government has stepped up 
the disarmament programme. Over the past year, the Government has recovered 2,545 
illegal weapons from civilians through an extended amnesty and use of force.6 These 
firearms were destroyed on 23 March 2010 at a ceremony to mark the anniversary of the 
Nairobi Declaration on Small Arms and Light Weapons. However, lack of an effective policy 
to address proliferation of arms constrains progress in this respect. Consequently, special 
operations to recover firearms have been characterised by claims of human rights violations, 
such as rape, by security officers.7   
Cross border conflicts 
18. Resource-based conflicts on decline:  Resource based conflicts had reduced during the 
period between January and March. However, insecurity along the Sudan-/Ethiopia border 
with Kenya continues. There are repeated incursions by the Toposa and Merille herdsmen 
from Sudan and Ethiopia respectively.8 Although the Kenya military and administration 
police have set up bases in the affected areas, tensions remain high.9 The IC/GLR Peace and 
Security project to simultaneously disarm communities and support their livelihoods is yet 
to be successfully rolled out successfully in the five neighbouring countries.10 Critical at this 
point is to reinforce inter-state peace building mechanisms because disarmament alone is 
not a sustainable solution.  
19. Somalia conflict a growing threat to security and economy: Cross border incursion into 
North Eastern Province by groups associated with Al Shabaab militia from Somalia is a 
growing threat to security. Incursions cause fear and uncertainty in the province due to the 
risk of internationalisation of the Somalia conflict.11 There were reports in March that forces 
allied to the transitional government of Somalia were being trained in Kenyan.12 Media 
reports observe that Kenyan nationals and refugees from the Dadaab Refugee Camp were 
recruited and trained to take part in the Somali conflict.13  
20. The large number of Somalia refugees in Kenya and their possible connection to conflicts at 
home raises the need to carefully monitor the conflict in Somalia and its impact on security 
in Kenya. Also there are media reports have been published on how the Somalia conflict 
could be impacting on the economy through investment of money from conflict and piracy-
related activities in Kenya’s property markets.14 This is an issue that requires close 
                                                 
5 In the late 1970s, some influential politicians and the police leadership constituted and equipped a ‘private army’ 
whose nickname was ‘Ngoroko’ based in Nakuru. The aim was to use the force to accede to power. Joseph Karimi 
and Philip Ochieng (1980), The Kenyatta Succession, Nairobi: Transafrica Book Distributor. Pp.109 – 110. 
6 Interview with Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms, 23 Feb 2010 
7 Interview with Kenya Human Rights Commission, 6 March, 2010  
8
 ‘Two soldiers killed at Kenya-Sudan Border’ Daily Nation, 15 Feb 2010 
9
 Interview with a senior government official, 24 March 2010 
10
 Interview with NGO staff working on security issues in the Horn of Africa, 3 March 2010 
11
 Interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 Feb 2010 
12
 Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008), released 10 
March 2010, pp 26-27; 55-57  
13
 ‘Kenya Trains Somali Youths’ The Star, 19 March 2010; ‘Kenya Stuck with Somali Mercenaries’ The Star  
14
 American Chronicle, “Somali pirates behind Kenya property boom?”  Tuesday, April 20, 2010. 
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/printfriendly/134; Propertywire.com/new/Africa/ “Somali 
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monitoring. The country is moving towards elections and such money could easily find its 
way into politics. 
Demobilisation and disbandment of illegally armed groups 
21. Violence by illegal groups has declined – but criminal activities persist: Previous reports 
have shown that it has been difficult to formulate and implement a clear strategy to deal with 
illegal groups because they hold powerful politicians and the business community to 
ransom. These groups have thus difficult for them to fight the illegal groups. This has made 
it easy for these groups to engage in social banditry without fear. Findings from the survey 
and interviews conducted across the country show that new groups have emerged in some of 
the major towns including Nakuru, Kisumu and Mombasa. However, although crimes by 
these groups have increased, violence from local armed groups has declined; there has a 
been a lull in their activities. Across the country many people feel that violence by these 
groups has decreased. 
Figure 1: In the past six months, do you think violence from local armed groups has increased, decreased, 
or stayed about the same? 
 
 
22. Interviews in Nairobi show that in addition to older and bigger groups such as Mungiki and 
Siafu, new groups such as ‘Mau Mau’ and ‘Sub Area’ have emerged. According to survey 
findings, 38 per cent of respondents think these groups come to ‘provide security’. The 
survey also identified the following new groups in four provinces: 
                                                                                                                                                             
pirates behind real estate boom in Kenya, it is claimed”. Monday, 04 January 2010; The Associated Press, 
“Somali pirates investing in Kenya property? Little Mogadishu’ neighborhood of Nairobi sees new 
investment”. Friday, January 1, 2010. 
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Table 2: New groups in four provinces 
Rift Valley Central Western  Nyanza  
Akirim  Mahigani  Home Guards Saba Saba 
Jerie Youth Forum Nyumba Kumi Ocampo  
Alkotela Sub-Area Kamisinga  
Rebor  Mundere Lobby  
Nyong’ara    
Kwathela    
23. Leaders of illegally armed groups generating funds for 2012: Interviews in Nairobi slums, 
Central Rift Valley and Central Province reveal that some leaders of these illegal groups 
intend to seek elective positions and are saving and investing the proceeds from extortion to 
raise funds for political campaigns in 2012.  Indeed, some critics see the sudden conversion 
of members of some of these groups into Christianity as a strategy of legitimizing their 
groups ahead of 2012. Moreover, the conversion has not stopped members from extorting 
money from different various businesses. If anything, they have increased the amounts 
charged, as shown in Table 3 below: 
Table 3: Comparative extortion rates in eastern Nairobi for 2009/10 (in ksh.) 
Zone controlled Nissan Matatu (daily) Move House (once) 
2009 2010 2009 2010 
Kayole 300 500 400 650 
Mathare 400 500 500 550 
Dandora 500 600 400 600 
Huruma (Thaai) 300 500 200 600 
Source: Interviews in Eastlands, March 2010 
24. A majority of Kenyans give information about insecurity to the police and local councillors. 
Not many appear to seek help from local armed groups. Again this reinforces the need for 
fundamental police reforms.  
Table 4: Please tell me if members of your community have done any of the following to help 
combat insecurity in your community in the past six months…. (percent answering “Yes”) 
 December ‘08 August ‘09 February ‘10 
Take the law into their own hands  20% 33% 33% 
Patrol streets or form neighbourhood watches  28% 31% 28% 
Give information to the police  46% 66% 68% 
Give information to local councillors  27% 42% 46% 
Seek help from local armed groups  14% 17% 12% 
25. The Government has initiated the witness protection programme and introduced 
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amendments to the legislation supporting the programme to make it functional by April 
2010. 15 However, CSOs have raised concerns over the proposed amendments. They fault the 
narrow definition of ‘witness’ and argue that the programme itself lacks structural and 
statutory authority.16  
26. Threats against witnesses continue following progress by the ICC prosecutor: As reported 
in the last review period, fear of prosecution has led to increased intimidation of potential 
witnesses and human rights defenders. Civil society organisations have reported the deaths 
of two potential witnesses, continuing threats and intimidation of scores of others who have 
gone into hiding or fled into exile.17 Even though incidents of witness intimidation are well 
noted and those involved known, the government has not arrested and prosecuted anyone. 
Because of this, confidence of witnesses in a Government-run witness protection programme 
has waned.  
27. Some politicians are manipulating victims: Some victims complain that senior and powerful 
politicians are holding meetings with them and urging them not to participate in either the 
TJRC or any future investigative process including the ICC.18 Victims who have been 
approached claim the politicians have promised them parcels of land and scholarships for 
their children if they decide not to give evidence. They also argue that these politicians 
regularly give monetary incentives to IDP leaders to influence them to prevail upon IDPs not 
to give any evidence. These are issues of concern because these interventions can prevent 
witnesses from giving evidence or undermine the credibility of the evidence itself. 
Enhancing security and protection of the population 
28. Confidence in police is on the rise compared to 2008: While illegally armed groups have 
formed for community protection, the survey indicates that Kenyans prefer to be protected 
by the police. That overwhelming majorities attribute the responsibility of security provision 
to the police rather than local armed groups (militias) corroborates the need to urgently 
undertake fundamental police reforms. More citizens would have confidence in the police if 
the force had been reformed. Unfortunately, two years on, reforms are yet to be implemented. 
Figure 2: Do you think it is more important for local armed groups to protect their communities, or is 
it more important for the police to protect communities 
 
29. Absence of fundamental police reforms is an issue of concern. There is concern that no 
fundamental changes have occurred within the police force; there is no significant policy 
change and no significant institutional reforms have taken place. An Implementation 
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 Interview with a senior government official, 24 March 2010  
16
 KPTJ submission to the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Team, 25 March 2010 
17
 Interview with staff of a national human rights institution, 19 March 2010  
18
 Interviews with categories of victims in the Rift Valley and Nairobi, Feb-March 2010 
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Committee was appointed in February 2010 to oversee and fast-track reform 
implementation but the Committee is yet to begin substantive work.19  Commenting on the 
lack of genuine support for fundamental reforms, some police officers note that if violence 
similar to that witnessed in the post-election violence in 2007 were to reoccur, the police 
would respond exactly as they did then: ‘Why would they react differently today? Nothing 
has changed to stop police from behaving the way they did. Paying allowances that are 
overdue is not reforms...  If they give new uniform, is that reform? Transfer of officers 
from one station to another also is not reforms… Some of the respondents said reform is 
about investing resources in improving police capacity to carry out investigations and 
enforce the law. Without resources to build police capacity, nothing is going to change.20   
Restoration of fundamental rights and liberties  
30. Extra-judicial killings and excessive use of force in practice sometimes: The scepticism 
about fundamental police reforms is reflected in the resurgence of extra-judicial killings. In 
March 2010, administration police in a Nairobi suburb executed seven taxi operators. 
Demonstrators protesting the execution were violently dispersed. This incident indicates the 
pervasiveness of impunity and lack of reforms within the police force. Indeed there are 
reports that police are still using live bullets to disperse demonstrators. The execution of 
members of proscribed groups also is reportedly taking place.21  
31. Freedom of the media likely to be restricted through new laws: Kenya has some of the most 
liberal media in the region. It is also highly pluralised if not sufficiently diverse. Over the 
past few years, the Government has introduced a number of proposals in consultation with 
the Communications Commission of Kenya in order to implement the Kenya 
Communications Act, 1998 which was amended in 2008. These include the Kenya 
Communications (Radio Communications and Frequency) Regulations, 2009, and the 
Kenya Communications (Broadcasting) Regulations 2009.  
32. While these are positive in terms of improving competition, the new rules have been widely 
viewed as restrictive and likely to gag the media. They also contain gaps that could lead to 
political manipulation of the media.22 For example the Minister in charge has powers to 
search and seize broadcast equipment and the right to intercept and disclose telephone calls, 
emails and letters. The Act also gives a government-controlled Communications 
Commission of Kenya the power to license and regulate broadcasting services and to 
prescribe the nature and content of media broadcasts. Moreover, the penalties for press 
offences - fines and imprisonment – provided by the Act could lead to unjustified restriction 
of the right to freedom of expression.23 
33. Self-regulation is critical: Although there have been concerns about the restrictive potential 
of these laws, there are also concerns about effectiveness of self-regulation by the media. 
Coordination between the Ministry, the Media Council, as well as new bodies such as the 
National Cohesion and Integration Commission should be structured in earnest to develop 
strategies for addressing issues around media, hate speech and negative ethnicity. This 
coordination is also critical for the purpose of ensuring that media laws adhere to Article 19 
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 Interview with a senior government official, 23 March 2010 
20
 Interview with senior officials, 23 Feb 2010 
21
 Interview with National Commission on Human Rights, 20 March 2010; KPTJ submission, op cit 
22
 Interview with member  of the Editors Guild, 22 Feb 2010; interview with staff of Article 19 in Nairobi, Feb 2010  
23
 Article 19, Article 19’s Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review for the Republic of Kenya; Report  for 
consideration at the eight session of the UPR Working Group 3, 3-14 May 2010. 
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of the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights24 because some of the media laws and 
others such as the Official Secrets Act, the Public Order Act, the Defamation Act and the 
Preservation of Public Security Act, restrict or threaten the freedom of expression.25  
34. Harassment of journalists has reduced - compared to 2008 – but self censorship continues: 
Harassment of journalists in this period has been on the decline compared to early 2008. 
However, there were several incidents in which the police harassed journalists and 
prevented them from accessing public functions. These forms of harassment and 
intimidation lead to self-censorship among journalists.26 The legislation on defamation, for 
instance, suppresses freedom of expression as journalists fear punitive awards for libel by 
the courts. Past incidents of harassment and fears of defamation offences suppress these 
freedoms because of the fear of libel charges under laws relating to defamation.27 In addition 
to self-censorship, the report by Article 19 observes that journalists investigating corruption 
are sometimes threatened and attempts are made to bribe them. This also contributes to 
self-censorship.   
Freedom of Assembly 
35. Freedom of Assembly yet to be fully restored to the pre-2007 levels: Past reports showed 
that freedom of assembly has not been restored to the status that prevailed before the 2007 
general elections. The police violently dispersed protestors, including those by IDPs 
demanding attention to their plight and support. Police arrest and charge people with taking 
part in an illegal assembly. The figure below shows the main trends in incidents that violated 
freedom of assembly between March 2009 and February 2010. The table shows that March 
2009 had more incidents during the past 12 months while the cases in March 2010 included 
dispersal of those demonstrating against evictions from the Mau Forest Complex. These 
included violent dispersal of demonstration against extra-judicial killings. Others included 
disruption of protests by social movement, Bunge La Mwananchi. The incidents noted in 
January 2010 include dispersal of demonstrations against the arrest and extradition of a 
Muslim cleric.  
Figure 3: Obstruction of the freedom of assembly 
 
                                                 
24
 The UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights emphasizes that ‘everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression and the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds… in any media. Although the 
rights are subject to restrictions, these restrictions are only necessary for respect and/or reputation of others…and 
protection of national security, among others.   
25
 Article 19’s Submission to the UN, op cit, p. 3 
26
 Interviews with the Editors Guild, March 2010;  
27
 Though cases of libel are rare and isolated, the existence of such a law suppresses freedom of expression. 
Interview with editor, 2 March 2010; see also ‘From libel to jail terms: press liberty is on a roll’ Daily Nation 3May 
2007. Powerful politicians have in the past been  awarded huge sums in damages for libel. 
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36. Discriminatory application of restrictions is common: The restriction on the freedom of 
assembly does not apply uniformly. Police allow demonstrations in support of government 
positions or of senior politicians in Government.28 They forcibly and violently disperse those 
calling attention to failures of the Government or demanding services. During some of these 
incidents police have used live bullets.29 Police also ban rallies they consider politically 
sensitive. And even though the amended Public Order Act requires them to simply be 
informed about intention to hold a rally three days in advance, police sometimes refuse to 
give timely acknowledgement of receipt of such legal notices. 
 
37. Interviews and survey data indicates that the Government largely respects press freedom but 
restricts freedom of assembly. According to the February survey, positive perceptions of the 
Government’s respect for Kenyans’ basic human and constitutional rights have increased 
since December 2008.  
 
Table 5: Public perception of the Government’s respect of basic human and constitutional rights 
 
December 
‘08   
August  
‘09   
January
‘10   
 Respects 
Does not 
respect 
Don’t  
know  Respects  
Does not  
respect 
Don’t  
know  Respects  
Does not 
respect 
Don’t  
know  
The right to 
freely hold public 
meetings  34% 61% 5% 59% 35% 6% 54% 43% 3% 
Freedom of 
speech  38% 59% 4% 66% 28% 5% 61% 36% 3% 
Freedom of the 
press  20% 76% 4% 63% 31% 6% 51% 44% 5% 
Sanctity of 
human life
30
  -- -- -- 48% 43% 9% 49% 46% 5% 
Right to 
demonstrate
31
 -- -- -- -- -- -- 29% 65% 6% 
38. While more citizens thought the Government respects the freedom of the press in August 
2009 (66 per cent) compared to December 2008 (20 per cent), that number has dropped 
down to 51 per cent in January 2010. The February 2010 survey was the first to ask whether 
people think the Government respects the right to demonstrate, following confrontations 
                                                 
28
 During the month of February 2010 police allowed civil society groups to demonstrate in support of the Prime 
Minister’s demand to have two Ministers step aside to allow for completion of corruption investigations. The same 
group was prevented from holding public demonstrations organized during the commemoration of two civil society 
people executed by police in 2009. By law, the amended Public Order Act, police do not have the power to ban 
peaceful assemblies.. 
29
 Interview with member of a social movement in Nairobi, 4 March 2010; members of the group have been 
arbitrarily arrested and fined for holding public discussion forums or taking part in demonstrations 
30
 Asked only in August 2009 and January 2010 survey. 
31
 Asked only in January 2010 survey. 
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between police and protestors in Nairobi and Mombasa. Only 29 per cent of Kenyans think 
the Government respects the right to demonstrate. 
39. Despite lack of sufficient protection from the Government for the post-election violence 
witnesses, the survey findings show that 55% of respondents support prosecution of post-
election violence perpetrators through The Hague rather than in Kenya (23%). 
Figure 4: Should those individuals responsible for post-election violence be tried through a 
Special Division of the High Court, a local Special Tribunal, or the Hague? 
 
 
40. About 78 per cent of those who prefer The Hague would like prosecution to proceed even if 
the Government does not guarantee protection of witnesses. Only 19 per cent don’t think the 
prosecution should go forward while 3 per cent do not know. This trend by the public to 
prefer the Hague option to try suspects of PEV has not changed since August 2009. 
Table 6: Should those individuals responsible for post-election violence be tried through a special 
division of the high court, a local special tribunal, or the Hague? (Comparison of surveys) 
 August 2009 January 2010 
Hague 58% 55% 
Local special tribunal 14% 17% 
Shouldn’t be tried 12% 14% 
Special division of High Court 7% 6% 
Both Hague and local tribunal -- 3% 
Don’t know 9% 5% 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
41. The lull in the activities of illegally armed groups may not mean they groups have been 
disbanded and disarmed. The groups may not politically active currently, but some are 
active as extortion gangs, while others are shedding their negative image and aligning with 
political actors in readiness to contest for political posts in 2012. The Government does not 
have a coherent strategy to deal with these groups, which are also collecting illegal taxes and 
protection money from the poor. Senior Government officials’ covert and overt engagement 
with leaders of such groups sends mixed signals about the Government position on ethnic 
militia.  
42. Many Kenyans support the prosecution of leaders of illegal groups and perpetrators of the 
post election violence. These findings suggest that prosecution is critical for the purpose of 
ending impunity. The findings also indicate the need expedite fundamental police reforms 
and accountability processes. 
43. There is an improvement in efforts to fully restore fundamental freedoms and rights; 
Freedom of Assembly is constrained. Compared to 2008 during the post-election violence, 
media freedom has considerably improved. Incidents of harassment of journalists, however, 
tend to lead to self-censorship and thus suppression of this freedom. 
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3.  AGENDA ITEM 2: ADDRESSING THE HUMANITARIAN 
CRISIS, PROMOTING NATIONAL HEALING AND RECONCILIATION 
 
Introduction 
44. Agenda Item 2 of the KNDR focused on addressing the humanitarian crisis and promoting 
national healing and reconciliation. The KNDR agreement emphasised the need for the 
parties to encourage and assist displaced persons to return to their homes or move to new 
areas, and to lead the process of national healing, reconciliation and reconstruction.   
45. Review of progress made in the rehabilitation of IDPs has shown that while the 
Government’s resettlement programme (Operation Rudi Nyumbani) ended in December 
2008, thousands of IDPs remain in camps and other settlements away from their former 
homes. Previous reports also noted that national level political conflicts e.g. over corruption 
and eviction from forest areas tend to trickle down, rekindling ethnic antagonisms at the 
local level. This pattern of peace punctuated by threats has frustrated genuine reconciliation 
efforts. The pattern has also ethnicised policy and reform debates. Politicians are 
increasingly interpreting policies from an ethnic view point rather than from a national 
perspective.  
46.  This section reviews progress made in resettlement efforts and in promoting healing and 
reconciliation. It covers the period between January and March 2010. 
Key findings 
Summary of findings 
• National Policy on IDPs formulated 
• IDPs demand to be resettled before rather than register as voters in host 
communities  
• Resettlement programme stalls for lack of funds 
• Flooding in arid and semi arid lands displaces hundreds of pastoralists   
• Litigation against the TJRC draws mixed reactions from civil society and victims 
of past injustices 
Resettlement of IDPs 
47. Draft IDP Policy in place: Past reports indicated that there was no IDP policy in place to 
guide resettlement and address the plight of IDPs. During this period, the Ministry of Justice 
in conjunction with the Ministry of Special Programmes and the Protection Cluster have 
completed drafting of a National Policy on IDPs. The draft policy, which was drafted by a 
member of staff seconded from the office of the UN Representative on the Human Rights of 
IDPs, is yet to be presented to the Cabinet.  
48. Some IDPs still in camps: Previous reports noted that by the end of October 2009, the 
Government had closed all formal camps. It has also been noted that the closure did not 
translate into an end to displacement because thousands of IDPs were unable or unwilling to 
return to their former homes either because they were landless and therefore had nowhere 
to return to, or because persistent insecurity and fear prevented effective return. Statistics 
from the Ministry of Special Programme as of 3 March 2010 reveal that 3,714 households 
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remain in 25 transit camps in Molo (12), Uasin Gishu32 (5) and Trans Nzoia West (8).  
49. Government to buy land for IDPs: The March 2010 IDP Status Brief notes that the 
Government has set aside sh. 1.4 billion for the purchase of 14, 600 acres of land on which to 
resettle IDPs.  Each IDP household will receive 2.25 acres in a settlement designed as an eco-
village. So far, a total of 705 families have been relocated from Mawingu camp in Nyandarua 
to Nakuru, Nakuru North and Molo districts. The Government has identified other farms 
where more IDPs are to be resettled. IDPs to settle in these have also been identified. These 
farms include Giwa farm (444 families), Managu farm (56) and Mau Summit (141), all in the 
Rift Valley. At Giwa farm, the Government has provided building materials and construction 
has begun.33 More farms are being identified and purchased to settle the balance of 6,802 
targeted households.  Only those who had pooled resources and bought their pieces of land 
will benefit from this programme. This has caused anger and resentment amongst other 
IDPs, particularly those who have not received any funds.  
50. Assistance bypassing those in transit camps: Interviews in transit camps and survey 
findings reveal that, despite efforts to resettle IDPs, those who are in transit camps after the 
post-election violence are likely to remain displaced for a long time because of landlessness. 
They are not targeted to receive land. At the same time, the Government is not allocating 
land to new self-helps formed for the purpose of buying land.34  
51. IDPs are continuously expectant and anxious: The process of identifying, procuring, 
surveying and subdividing the land is long, and delays have caused concerns amongst IDPs 
about whether they will indeed receive the land.35 The scepticism is reinforced by allegations 
of corruption by both government officials and representatives or leaders of IDPs.36 
However, even as the government rolls out the distribution of land to IDPs, some IDPs are 
raising funds to purchase land on their own. For instance, in February, IDPs raised ksh. 
500,000 towards the purchase of a 69-acre farm in Kinangop.37  
52. Not all IDPs have received start up and reconstruction funds: Statistics from the Ministry of 
Special Programs show that about 95 per cent of targeted IDPs have received Ksh. 10,000 to 
restart their basic livelihoods. However, about half (51 per cent) have not received the ksh. 
25,000 promised to reconstruct their homes.38  During this period, no further funds for 
reconstruction were distributed to IDPs. The decision to purchase land for IDPs led to the 
transfer of some funds of the Ministry of Special Programme’s annual budgetary allocation 
to the Ministry of Lands.39 This reportedly made it difficult for the Ministry of Special 
Programmes to disburse funds to IDPs.  
53. The perception of Government’s performance in resettling IDPs is improving: Over the last 
two years, there have been variations in the public’s perception of the Government’s 
performance in resettling IDPs. Whereas in December 2008, 43 per cent of the public said 
they were very or somewhat satisfied with the Government’s efforts, this dropped to 37 per 
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 New Wareng District 
33
 Interview with Resettlement Officer at the Ministry of Special Programs, 14 March 2010  
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 Interview with integrated IDPs in Nakuru town, Feb/March 2010; interview with official at the Ministry of 
Special Programmes 
35
 Interviews in Nyandarua and Nakuru among IDPs at camps for the self-help groups, Feb 2010 
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 Ibid 
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 Interview with member of the Kenya National IDP Network 11 March 2010; see also ‘IDPs raise sh. 500,000 to 
buy land in Kinangop’ The Star 8 Feb 2010  
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 Ministry of Special Programs, IDP Status Briefs January – March 2010 
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 Interview with senior official, Ministry of Special Programmes, March 2010 
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cent in August 2009. However, this has improved to 51 per cent in the latest survey – 
February 2010. Accounting for this variation may be the fact that IDPs problems are no 
longer profiled and therefore not many people are aware about the current situation of IDPs. 
At the same time, news of the government resettling some of the IDPs is seen as a positive 
approach to their plight.  
 
54. Claims of corruption yet to be addressed: Claims of corruption and embezzlement of 
humanitarian funds cloud some of these accomplishments particularly because no one has 
been successfully prosecuted.40 The Ministry of Internal Security conducted an internal 
audit of the disbursement of funds. The audit revealed the loss of about Ksh. 180m.41 In 
December 2009, the National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR)  and the Kenya 
Human Rights Commission (KHRC) released separate reports also showing cases of 
misappropriation of resettlement funds.42 The reports have generated pressure for those 
involved to be prosecuted. Parliament itself has asked that the implicated individuals be 
prosecuted.43 Investigations are going on but no one has been successfully prosecuted.  
55. The public is sensitive to and concerned about the plight of IDPs: Survey findings reveal that 
the general public remains sensitive to the problems facing IDPs. When asked what they 
think is the most important way that the Government can address the problem of IDPs, a 
majority of Kenyans said a resettlement scheme of some kind is necessary. But IDPs 
themselves appear unwilling to return to the flashpoints of violence, preferring to be 
resettled elsewhere. 
Access to relief and assistance funds 
56.  By March 2010, the Ministry of Special Programmes had disbursed ksh 10,000 to a total of 
157, 598 IDP households to restart their lives. Rift Valley has had the largest share (69.84 
per cent) of the funds because it is home to a majority of IDPs. Nyanza province is second at 
11.98 percent. The table 7 below shows distribution of funds by the Ministry. 
Table 7: Distribution of IDP funds by Province 
  Province  Start up funds (ksh. 
10,000) 
 % of 
total 
1 Rift Valley 1100706000 69.84 
2 Coast  11,580,000 0.73 
3 Eastern  3,264,000 0.21 
4 Central  101,030,000 6.41 
5 Nairobi  37,940,000 2.41 
6 Western  132,672,000 8.42 
7 Nyanza 188,788,000 11.98 
  Total  1,575,980,000 100.00 
Source: Ministry of Special Programmes, March 2010 
57. The Ministry and other agencies are supporting recovery: The Ministry of Special 
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 Interviews in Nairobi, Central and parts of the Rift Valley, February 2010  
41
Interview with a senior Government official, 16 Feb 2010 
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 KNCHR press release ‘Outcome of KNCHR assessment of GoK Resettlement Programme of IDPs and 
Corruption Allegations’ 2 Dec 2009; KHRC, Out in the Cold, Dec 2009 
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 Also ‘MPs demand audit of sh.2b IDP cash’ The Standard, Feb 1, 2010; ‘Probe on for theft of millions of IDP 
cash’ Daily Nation, 9 Feb 2010 
23 
 
Programmes in conjunction with various humanitarian organisations has continued to 
provide shelter and livelihoods recovery support to IDPs in the Rift Valley. In this regard, 
38,145 households or 48.7 per cent of the targeted households have received Ksh. 25,000 for 
reconstruction of houses.44 
58. Farm restoration prioritised: The Government has also borrowed Ksh. 1.9 billion shillings 
from the African Development Bank to support livelihoods recovery projects and peace and 
reconciliation initiatives. Projects under the Restoration of Farm Infrastructure and Rural 
Livelihoods are to be implemented in six districts affected by the post-election violence.45 
Beneficiaries receive fertilisers and farm inputs. This government project will complement 
similar projects being implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
and civil society groups in the same regions.  
59. Beneficiaries’ distress and competing needs challenges reconstruction efforts: Some 
beneficiaries have diverted the money meant for shelter reconstruction or purchase of 
household items to other uses. The money has been used in different ways such as 
entertainment, paying school fees, as seed capital to start small businesses, to pay rent and 
even buy land for the landless.46   
New threats adding to numbers of IDPs 
60. New displacements from implementation of policies: The eviction of persons who had 
illegally encroached on the Mau Forest in January and February 2010 caused encampment 
of about 2000 people whose homes were destroyed by forest guards. Although some experts 
argued that these were not IDPs in the conventional sense,47  their encampment created 
genuine humanitarian needs. The eviction of land owners with genuine legal titles has been 
stayed awaiting a policy decision on whether or not to compensate them. A survey to 
determine the boundaries of the forest is yet to be completed. 48 
61. Floods compounding the humanitarian crisis: Heavy rains at the onset of the long rains 
season (March-June) have caused flooding in different parts of the country. By the end of 
the first week of March 2010, the Kenya Red Cross Society reported that over 8,360 people 
in Northern Kenya, parts of Nyanza and parts of Rift Valley had been displaced or affected 
by the floods in different ways. The drought that preceded the rains had also caused conflicts 
over resources. These conflicts displaced many people in these areas. Unfortunately, the 
focus of the resettlement programme is on the post-election violence case load. New IDPs 
are left without assistance.  
62. Problems facing the IDPs are far from over: These findings show that the humanitarian 
problem is yet to be resolved. The Government made progress in resettling some of the IDPs 
but some are still in transit camps because of insecurity and/or they did not receive start up 
funds and shelter reconstruction funds. In this regard, it is important that the government 
disburses funds to the remaining households. It is also significant that an IDP policy has 
been formulated and is awaiting presentation to the Cabinet. Approval and implementation 
should be expedited so as to resolve the IDP problem. Further, there is need also to begin 
assisting the new case loads – those displaced by natural factors as well as conflicts. Though 
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 Interviews with IDPs in Nakuru and Molo, Feb 2010 
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 Email discussion with former UNHCR Protection Officer, Jan 2010 
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not part of the post-election caseloads, respect and promotion of human dignity is the 
essence of humanity; humanitarian assistance should not bypass these groups. 
Promoting healing and reconciliation  
63. Peace building initiatives taking place: The government and civil society organisations have 
continued to support peace-building initiatives at the community level. In particular, district 
peace committees have convened meetings at the local level to discuss peace and security 
issues. However, the number of meetings has reduced due to lack of funds to facilitate 
transport and other logistical inputs needed to convene meetings.49  
64. Discrimination on ethnic basis decreased: The survey findings on healing and reconciliation 
reveal two main trends. First, is the low proportion of respondents reporting discrimination 
in August 2009 (11 per cent) and February 2010 (14 per cent). The second is the significant 
decline –by 21 points- of reported discrimination between the first baseline survey in 
December 2008 and the August 2009 follow-up.  However results from the latest round in 
February 2010 show a slight up tick of 4 per cent. This is probably attributable to the trickle-
down effect of national level tensions and political conflicts.  
Table 8: Since just after the 2007 general elections, has anybody treated you unfairly because of 
your ethnicity? 
 December ‘08 August ‘09 February ‘10 
Yes  32% 11% 14% 
No  68% 88% 85% 
Don’t know  0% 1% 1% 
  
65. Communities gradually accepting others: During the post-election period, ethnic divisions 
deepened. Communities were suspicious of others – they were not getting along. From 
December 2008, there is a gradual acceptance of one another in that 23 per cent reported in 
December 2008 that their groups had problems getting along with other ethnic 
communities. By February 2010 only 12 per cent said they had difficulties. 
66. Enacting legislations to support these accomplishments is important: While people are now 
accepting one another compared to the immediate post-election violence, the laws to punish 
practice of negative ethnicity and discrimination are yet to be enacted. Equal opportunities 
and equality bill, hate speech bill, and also Freedom of Information bill, if enacted, would go 
a long way in eroding the basis for negative ethnicity. The National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission has already began identifying strategies for addressing some of these practices 
but absence of relevant laws will constrain progress in this regard. 
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 Interview with a district officer in Nakuru district, 6 March 2010 
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Figure 4: Does your ethnic community have problems getting along with other ethnic 
communities in Kenya? (Comparison of surveys) 
February '10
August '09
December '08
12%
15%
23%
85%
84%
73%
2%
1%
3%
Yes No Don’t know
 
 
67. Trust in members of other communities is also on the increase. Unsurprisingly, people 
largely trust their relatives, neighbours and members of their own ethnic group or co-
ethnics. They trust members of other communities less. They do not trust the rich and 
members of other races. 
Table 8: How much do you trust each of the following types of people? Comparison survey 
 
December 
‘08   
August  
‘09   
January  
‘10   
 Trust 
Don’t 
trust 
Don’t 
know Trust 
Don’t 
trust 
Don’t 
know Trust 
Don’t 
trust 
Don’t 
know 
Your relatives  85% 15% 0% 86% 14% 0% 84% 16% 0% 
Your neighbours  67% 33% 0% 70% 30% 0% 71% 30% 0% 
Members of your 
ethnic 
community  60% 40% 0% 68% 31% 0% 68% 32% 0% 
Members of 
other ethnic 
communities  38% 61% 0% 45% 54% 0% 49% 50% 1% 
Rich People  -- -- -- 29% 70% 2% 32% 67% 1% 
Poor people  -- -- -- 64% 35% 1% 65% 34% 0% 
Members of 
other races  -- -- -- 40% 56% 4% 41% 57% 2% 
 
68. These findings point to progress in reconciliation. That is, the past two years have shown 
improvement in terms of communities getting along with each other. There is general 
acceptance of other people. But as noted in the previous reports, this general picture is very 
different in certain parts of the country such as Rift Valley Province, where relations between 
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groups are marked by anxiety and national conflicts usually cause inter-group tension 
among them. 
69. Kenyans blame politicians for poor relations and violence: Current and previous surveys 
have shown that Kenyans blame politicians for instigating violence. They also show that 
politicians have great influence in promoting peace and reconciliation. Although some 
politicians have been threatening IDPs and other victims in an attempt to keep them from 
participating in truth seeking and accountability mechanisms, others have also been 
preaching peace.  
Figure 5: In the last six months have you heard speeches from political leaders discussing the 
restoration of peace and stability? 
Yes
56%
No
42%
Don’t know
1%
Refused
1%
 
70. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission has summoned persons associated with 
hate speech. Although the NCIC has the power to impose fines on such persons, it has 
sought to discourage such use of hate speech before taking firmer action.50 The NCIC has 
become an important institution for people to raise concerns about perceived ethnic 
discrimination.  
CONCLUSION 
 
71. The problems facing IDPs are far from over. Although the Government has provided 
assistance to many of them, about half of households registered as potential beneficiaries for 
reconstruction assistance are yet to receive the funds. It is important that the government 
expedites disbursement of funds to these households so that they can reconstruct their 
homes without further delay. 
72. The plight of IDPs has continued to recede on the list of national priorities. This calls for 
increased civil society advocacy to bring the IDP question back on the agenda. The 
investigation into the alleged irregular disbursement of the Humanitarian Fund should be 
speeded up and concluded with speed. Fostering accountability in the use of these funds is 
critical.  
73. Finally, there is need for the Government to take a human rights approach in addressing the 
problem of IDPs. Participation of IDPs in identifying solutions and making key decisions on 
suggested solutions, transparency and openness in the use of funds, responsibility and 
accountability in decision-making should form the main values and principles directing how 
the IDP problem is resolved. 
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 Interview with member of NCIC, 4 march 2010 
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4.  AGENDA ITEM 3: RESOLVING THE POLITICAL CRISIS (POWER 
SHARING) 
 
Introduction 
74. Agenda Item 3 recognised that the 2007 post election crisis revolved around issues of power 
and the functioning of state institutions. The mediation underlined that resolving the crisis 
required adjustments to the constitution to provide for power sharing and the formation of a 
Grand Coalition Government. This agenda was predicated on the assumption that power 
sharing would enable the government to fast track reforms. It was hoped that there would be 
‘unity of purpose’ to enable both parties to make decisions on important national issues.  
75. This section examines how the parties in the Grand Coalition Government are working 
together and how they are operationalising the principles undergirding power sharing and 
the coalition itself. The report covers the period between January and March 2010.  
Key findings 
Summary of findings 
• Coalition continues to hold together but portrays the image of  ‘two-governments-
in-one’. 
• New alliances form within the coalition thereby reducing cohesion. 
• Factionalism affects the constitution review process. 
• Continued politicisation of reforms hinders service delivery. 
Why power sharing? 
76. Past reports pointed out that power sharing is usually recommended as a mechanism for 
promoting stability in deeply fragmented societies because no single party can govern alone. 
Inclusive government, therefore, brings all major parties together to enable hard decision 
making and promotion of the national good. A Grand Coalition usually brings together all 
groups to protect and promote national unity.51  
77. Power sharing also requires political elites to compromise, consult and negotiate, and rise 
above sectional (ethnic) and personal differences. It requires the leadership to nurture a 
sense of unity of purpose in order to pursue reforms critical for the stability of the country. 
As noted in the previous reports, structured mechanisms for building consensus and general 
consultations are established to ensure that relevant laws, policies and reforms are 
implemented with bi-partisan support and approach. 
78. The Kenya Grand Coalition Government was not formed as an end in itself. It was meant to 
facilitated pursuance of comprehensive reforms including those that would address the 
fundamental causes of the crisis. For this to be achieved, the parties needed to work together 
in good faith as partners, compromise and engage in consultations for the sake of moving 
the country forward. 
                                                 
51
 Lijphart, Arend (1969), ‘Consociational Democracy’. World Politics, 21, 2: 207-225; Lijphart, Arend 
(2004), ‘Constitutional Design for Divided Societies’ in Journal of Democracy Volume 15:2: 96-108; 
Reynolds, Andrew, Ed. (2002). The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict 
Management, and Democracy. London: Oxford University Press. 
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New political conflicts within the coalition 
79. Image of two governments in one persists: Two years since the formation of the coalition 
government, cohesion within Government has been elusive. The image of ‘two-governments-
in- one’ persists. Divisions along ethnic and political lines continue to be manifested within 
Government. These divisions now pose a threat to the passage of a new constitution. Lack of 
cohesion has its origins in multiple interpretations of the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act (referred to here as National Accord) as well as the unending suspicion 
and mistrust that characterised relations between the two parties even before the post-
election violence. Furthermore, both parties had distinct ideals about how they intended to 
govern if they won the elections. Be that as it may, the purpose of power sharing is to 
establish a framework for dissolving these differences and uniting to pursue the common 
good in the national interest. Achieving this unity of purpose remains a major challenge. 
80. The Principals’ different positions on issues reflect disunity: By the end of 2009, the two 
Principals appeared to have established cordial working relationship. The two Principals 
appear to be together but their actions on some important issues show their differences - 
they take opposing stands on important national issues.52 This is reflected in how the two 
Principals have recently approached important issues such as the war on corruption. For 
instance, when allegations of corruption in the free primary education fund and the 
subsidised maize scheme came to the fore, the Prime Minister asked that both the 
technocrats and politicians in the two ministries ‘step aside’ to allow for investigations. Two 
officers in his Ministry stepped aside. Later the President suspended only the technocrats, 
including the two from the Prime Ministers office. Thereafter the Prime Minister suspended 
two Ministers but the President overturned this decision. The debate that followed these 
actions did not centre on how to fight corruption; instead the debate focused on who has the 
power to suspend Ministers. These squabbles have denigrated the government’s war on 
corruption. Furthermore, Ministers now appear unwilling to assume political responsibility: 
the technocrats shoulder the burden..  
81. Conflicts affecting operations of the Government – the Cabinet did not meet between mid-
February and end of March: The conflicts between the two principles affect operations 
within the government and also trickle down to the local level, exacerbating tensions 
between different communities: ‘when the Principals are publicly working together, things 
move well in government. When they engage in open conflict, making decisions slows 
down’.53 Possibly because of this the Cabinet itself has not met from the middle of February 
2010. This affects the running of the government since issues that need cabinet approval are 
left pending.54 Further, for the last one year, there has been no Leader of Government 
Business in Parliament. Some MPs argue that this has slowed down the government’s 
legislative pace. 
82. No structured consultations between the partners: Disunity within the coalition is the result 
of limited or no structured consultation between the two Principals and the failure to 
recognise that power sharing is a reality.  Two years on, the coalition has no formal 
framework to guide its operations. This has resulted in continuous disagreements on the 
meaning of power sharing, which in turn increased incoherence. Past reports pointed out 
that without this framework, engagement between the two parties is usually ad hoc. The 
Permanent Committee for the Management of Coalition Affairs has failed to fill this gap. The 
                                                 
52
 Interview with a Chief , 31 January 2010 
53
 Interview with official, Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, 10 March 2010 
54
 Interview with a senior official, Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, 10 March 2010 
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health of the coalition, therefore, is dependent on the relations between the two Principals 
rather than on an agreed framework of operation. 
83. Parties are still not agreed on the meaning of power sharing: PNU argues that the 
President has the power to exercise executive authority; the constitution does not give power 
the Prime Minister. ODM, on the other hand, argues that the spirit of the National Accord 
envisioned power sharing between the President and the Prime Minister and therefore both 
should be consulting in making key decisions. On the whole, the problem of power sharing 
continues to poison relations between the two partners thereby firming perceptions of ‘two 
governments in one.’  
84. The public also feels power is not equally shared: The general public similarly feels that 
power in the Coalition Government is not equally shared. The February survey asked ‘Do you 
think power in the Coalition Government is shared equally or not equally? Upto 57 per cent 
of the respondents said power was not shared equally while 33 per cent said power was 
shared equally. Of those who said ‘power was not shared equally’, 71 per cent said PNU has 
more power while only 29 per cent said ODM has more power.  
Figure 6: Do you think power in the Coalition Government is shared equally or not equally? 
 
85. Disagreements leading to negatively competitive behaviour: Lack of cohesion and adoption 
of different and oppossing viewpoints on national issues have engendered unhealthy 
competition behaviour within the coalition. Allies of both parties appear to be in constant, 
usually harmful, competition – often seeking to outdo one another in readiness for the 2012 
elections.  
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Table 9: Do you think all of the parties are committed to sharing power in the coalition equally, or 
do you think some parties want more power?(Comparison of August and December surveys) 
 December ‘08 August ‘09 
 
January ‘10 
Equally 34% 23% 
 
24% 
Some want more power 60% 63% 65% 
Don’t know  5% 13% 11% 
Which party wants more power?    
PNU 41% 35% 
 
36% 
ODM 38% 47% 
 
43% 
Both PNU and ODM 21% 18% 
 
20% 
86. War on corruption a theatre for supremacy contests: The war on corruption, among others, 
has turned into a competition in terms of who can profile the other as most corrupt or anti-
reformist. Throughout February and March, for instance, the two partners sought to outdo 
or outshine each other. This informed acceptance or rejection of any policy including 
provisions in the draft Constitution. This also clouded the steps the government had made to 
fight corruption; in February 2008, for instance, senior technocrats convened in a high level 
meeting to discuss how to address corruption in ministries and parastals. The conflicts that 
ensued later clouded this important initiative. Significant also is that because of these 
conflicts, more people are now of the opinion that the coalition is not working together. In 
the February survey, 38 per cent of respondents believed that the Coalition Government had 
a very/ somewhat easy time working together in December 2008; this dropped to 22 per 
cent six months later. In January 2010, only 27 per cent of the respondents think the 
coalition has an easy time working together. 
Figure 7: Does the Coalition Government have a very easy, somewhat easy, somewhat hard, or 
very hard time working together? 
 
31 
 
87. Unequal power distribution deepening patronage politics:  Inability to resolve the issue of 
how to share power and distribute key public sector posts has had one consequence: 
deepening of patronage politics. Ministers now appoint their friends and political allies to 
senior positions on the basis of patronage rather than merit and without following due 
process. Some are making appointments on the basis of ethnicity or nepotism.55 This mode 
of appointments and composition of public sector positions has the potential to reduce 
accountability within the ministries and makes it difficult to punish corrupt personnel. 
Inter and intra party cohesion 
88. Political divisions continue to evolve within and among individual political parties: As 
reported in the previous report, these divisions are the result of shifting alliances that are 
forming to advance the individual interests of key politicians. Some of these alliances appear 
aimed at blocking certain reforms and policies, especially those perceived as threatening the 
interests of key politicians. In this regard, the prosecution of PEV suspects, debates on the 
constitution review and the 2012 elections have become the flashpoints around which inter 
and intra party divisions revolve.  
89. New centres of power have developed within each party; they can block reforms: The 
different issues that the country is addressing and the hard decisions that have to be made 
have resulted in development of new centres of power developing within the main parties. 
These are in turn contributing to incoherence within the coalition and have prevented the 
two Principals from firmly controlling their individual parties. This makes it difficult to 
develop a common approach on reforms. Some of the new alliances are aimed at blocking 
important policies if they threaten to undermine the individual interests of key leaders. In 
particular some have emerged possibly to block ICC prosecutions and undermine any efforts 
to bring leaders to account. But the divisions themselves reflect lack of leadership in the 
political parties and on the reform agenda in general.56 The failure to decisively address the 
problem of high level corruption is reflective of the influence of individual political interests 
over national interests. Thus, some politicians feel they can disregard orders without any 
repercussions.57 
90. Inter-Party Parliamentary Group Meetings are rare: During this period, there were several 
individual party parliamentary group meetings convened to assist each party develop a 
common position on reforms. However, joint coalition meetings were rare and limited to 
issues of the constitution. Regular inter-Party Group meetings are critical for the purpose of 
developing bi-partisan approaches and positions and strengthening cohesion within the 
Coalition.  
Cohesion in decision-making 
91. Cohesion is still elusive: Lack of cohesion within the parties has continued to affect 
coherence in decision-making within the Government two years after the formation of the 
coalition. The different official positions taken by individual parties have projected a public 
perception of ‘two governments in one.’ This has at times constrained delivery of services 
and has partly contributed to the slow pace of reforms. 
92. Lack of a framework to manage the Coalition to blame for incoherence: Incoherence in 
Government has been a feature of the Coalition since formation. Partly to blame is the lack 
of a binding agreement to manage the Coalition or even enforce key decisions. Essentially, 
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 Interview with a Commissioner, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, 17 February 2010 
56
 Interview with an official, Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, 10 March 2010 
57
 Interview with an MP, 17 February 2010 
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there are no adequate conflict resolution mechanisms hence political conflicts filter into the 
cabinet, affecting its cohesion.  
93. The referendum and the 2012 election require a conflict resolution mechanism: there are 
two important dates for which cohesion in the Coalition Government is critical: the 
referendum and the 2012 elections. Any disagreements over the constitution or 
intensification of succession politics will feed into the 2012 elections. Establishing a 
mechanism for resolving disputes and showing unity of purpose is very important at this 
state. Already, the Interim Independent Constitutional Dispute Resolution Court (IICDRC) 
is in place. The parties should be encouraged to use the court to address any dispute to avoid 
conflicts spilling over to the process leading to 2012. 
Public satisfaction with the Coalition Government 
94. Public satisfaction with the Coalition Government performance on increase compared to 
2008: performance of the Coalition in certain areas has shown marked improvement 
compared to 2008. These include protecting the rights of the media, giving IDPs financial 
support and respecting human rights. There is also improvement in their perception about 
whether the Coalition will deliver a new constitution. From a low of 31 per cent satisfaction 
rating in 2008, those satisfied with the government performance in implementing 
constitutional reforms increased to 54 per cent by February 2010.  But the public remains 
critical of performance in addressing problems of youth unemployment and regional 
inequalities. 
Table 10: How satisfied are you with the Coalition Government’s performance in the following 
areas? 
 
Dec 
‘08   
August 
‘09   
Jan 
‘10   
 Satisfied 
Dissatisfi
ed Dk Satisfied Dissatisfied Dk Satisfied 
Dissati
sfied Dk 
Promoting 
reconciliation among 
groups in Kenya 48% 50% 1% 48% 48% 
3
% 58% 39% 3% 
Giving IDPs financial 
support 40% 58% 2% 36% 57% 
6
% 50% 47% 3% 
Respecting human 
rights 31% 68% 1% 42% 54% 
3
% 49% 49% 2% 
Resettling IDPs 43% 55% 2% 37% 58% 
5
% 51% 46% 3% 
Promoting 
democracy 38% 60% 1% 43% 52% 
5
% --58 -- -- 
Reducing  tensions 
between ethnic 
communities in 
Kenya 47% 51% 1% 46% 51% 
3
% ----- ---- --- 
Protecting the rights 
of the media 23% 75% 2% 52% 42% 
5
% 51% 43% 5% 
Implementing 
constitutional 
reforms 31% 66% 2% 31% 64% 
5
% 54% 40% 6% 
Addressing the 
problem of youth 
unemployment 16% 82% 1% 32% 66% 
2
% 25% 73% 1% 
Addressing the 
problem of regional  
inequalities in Kenya -- -- -- 29% 63% 7% 34% 61% 5% 
Evicting people from 
forests -- -- -- -- -- -- 60% 37% 3% 
                                                 
58
 The dash implies the indicator was not asked during the survey. 
33 
 
95. Kenyans are unhappy about corruption and political conflicts: Kenyans are also unhappy 
about corruption, political conflicts and tribalism. The government is perceived to lack 
commitment to reforms and to fighting corruption. The public views government as only 
engaging in political wrangles. Asked about two things they dislike most about the Coalition 
Government, close to 40 per cent identified these three as the things they disliked most. 
Table 11: What are two things you dislike most about the Coalition Government? 
Rampant corruption  17%  
Political wrangles  15%  
Tribalism  6%  
High cost of living  5%  
Nothing  5%  
Unemployment  3%  
Poorly performing politicians  3%  
Disunity amongst politicians  3%  
Hate speeches amongst political leaders  3%  
False promises from leaders  3%  
Selfishness of politicians  3%  
Other  34%  
 
96. There are things that Kenyans like about the Government: Free Primary Education, 
restoration of peace, improved infrastructure, and health care: About 35 per cent identified 
improved basic services and restoration of peace as what they like most about the Coalition 
Government. 
Table 12: What are two things you like most about the Coalition Government? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97.  Kenyans by and large remain anxious on economic concerns and their material well-being. 
Nearly 20% of all responses are concerned about unemployment. Despite the starting of 
‘Kazi kwa vijana’ and other youth oriented initiatives, the problem of unemployment 
especially amongst the youth has not yet been effectively tackled. The high price of goods, 
inadequate food, education, and fighting corruption are the other major concerns. 
Nothing  19%  
Free primary education  17%  
Restoration of peace  7%  
Improved infrastructure  7%  
Improved health sector  4%  
CDF funds  3%  
Environmental conservation  3%  
Leaders working in harmony  3%  
Kazi kwa vijana  3%  
Other  34%  
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Table 13: What do you think are the three most important priorities for this government to 
address in the next twelve months? 
December ‘08  August ‘09  January ‘10  
Jobs 19% Jobs 20% Jobs 18% 
Reducing the price of 
goods 
19% Reducing the price of 
goods 
15% Reducing the price of 
goods 
13% 
Ensuring adequate 
food 
12% Ensuring adequate 
food 
10% Ensuring adequate food 10% 
Education 9% Education 9% Education 9% 
Fighting corruption 4% Fighting corruption 5% Fighting corruption 6% 
Restoring peace 7% Restoring peace 4% Restoring peace 4% 
Resettling IDPs 4% - - Resettling IDPs 0% 
- - Fighting poverty 7% Fighting poverty 10% 
      
Media freedom 3% - - Media freedom 2% 
Constitutional 
revision 
3% - - Constitutional revision 3% 
Land reform 3% - - Land reform 1% 
      
Other 6% Other 20% Other 15% 
 
98. Regardless of the slow pace of reforms and public service delivery, most of the public want 
the Coalition Government to serve its full term until 2012. 
Figure 8: Do you prefer that the Coalition Government continues until 2012, or do you prefer that the 
country holds general elections before 2012? 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Continue 
Coalition
Elections 
before 2012
Don't know
70%
28%
1%
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Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on 27 
December 2007 
99. In line with the recommendations of the Independent Review Commission on the General 
Election held in Kenya on 27 December 2007 (IREC), the government set up the Interim 
Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) and an Interim Independent Boundaries Review 
Commission (IIBRC) through the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, 2008. 
100. The IIEC voter registration is not continuous – some people may be locked out: The IIEC 
was tasked with reforming the electoral system and institutions. The commission has 
already set up a fully-fledged secretariat; recruited 17 regional coordinators and 210 
constituency coordinators and begun the voter registration exercise on 22 March 2010, 
targeting the registration of 10 million voters at the end of the 45 day period exercise.59 The 
voter registration exercise is not continuous and therefore may not register all potential 
interested eligible voters, who will therefore not take part in the referendum. This is one area 
on which electoral reforms should focus– making voter registration a continuous exercise 
and aligning it with registration of persons. Indeed IREC recommended that registration of 
persons and voters be conducted simultaneously. This will lead to registration of more voters 
and limit multiple registrations. 
101. Electronic voter register is innovative; expansion of coverage should be prioritised:  The 
Commission has received Ksh1.2 billion from treasury to start the voter registration process 
with the Government supposed to raise a further ksh 5.6 billion from the supplementary 
budget.60 The Commission will carry out electronic voter registration in 19 constituencies 
around the country on a pilot basis.61 When fully implemented, the electronic voter 
registration will restore public confidence in the entire process of voter registration, polling 
and tallying.62 Although this is a pilot exercise, it is important to have all constituencies 
covered before the 2012 elections. Furthermore, the focus should not be on registration 
alone; computerisation procedures for polling and vote tallying should be put in place before 
the 2012 election date. An infrastructure for this already exists going by coverage of mobile 
telephony and GSM network in the country. 
102. Manual voter registration does not restore public confidence in the electoral process:  
Currently, the IIEC is conducting manual voter registration. This is raising concerns that the 
exercise might be fraught with problems of multiple registration or manipulation of the 
register. If the new electoral system attracts the old accusations of a faulty register, the 
credibility of the whole process and of the IIEC itself will be damaged, risking a repeat of 
past events. The Commission should therefore seek to allay these fears through public 
education campaigns and introduction of electronic voter registration in the remaining 
constituencies after the pilot phase, of course integrating the lessons learnt during the pilot 
phase into the subsequent exercise. 
103. Confidence in the IIEC is improving: As it is, 60% of Kenyans believe that the IIEC is 
capable of holding free and fair by-elections, with 56% responding similarly about a 
constitutional referendum. Importantly, this shows significant gains from August 2009 
when only 36% were confident that the IIEC would be capable of holding free and fair by-
elections and 34% were confident of a free and fair referendum. 
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 Interview with IIEC Commissioner held on 16 February 2010 
60
 Interview with, IIEC official held on 26 March 2010 
61
 Targeted constituencies include Langata, Mvita, Imenti Central, Kikuyu, Nakuru, Ikolomani and South 
Mugirango 
62
 Interview with IIEC Commissioner held on 16 February 2010 
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Figure 9: In your opinion, will the new Electoral Commission be capable of holding…: 
 
The Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission 
104. The Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IIBRC) was mandated to provide 
recommendations on how to review the existing constituency and administrative boundaries 
to reflect geographical size, ease of communication, community of interest, population 
density and population trends. 
105. The IIBRC started countrywide hearings on 1st February 2010, aiming to complete the 
hearings on 10 May 2010. However, as previously reported, the Commission still faces 
challenges of overlap with the ongoing review process. The draft constitution has provided 
for the continuity of the IIBRC after the passing of the constitution. However, the Interim 
Commission does not have a mandate to determine boundaries for the proposed Counties. 
How various boundaries are mapped out has always been a political rather than 
administrative problem. This implies that the final outcome of IIBRC will be similarly 
politicised. IIBRC must, therefore, launch an intensive public education and information 
campaign ahead of its final outputs. It should also synergize with the relevant parliamentary 
committees in order to mobilise the required political support. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
106. Cohesion within the government has remained a major challenge since the formation of the 
Coalition. The Principals have not always managed to rally their parties together for the 
national good. Rather, political, ethnic and sectarian interests have dominated the reform 
process and are derailing consensus building on the constitutional review process. An 
effective conflict resolution mechanism is yet to be established.  
107. To repeat what previous reports have emphasised, there is no effective conflict resolution 
mechanism in place, nor does the Coalition operate on the basis of a binding agreement. The 
Permanent Committee on the Management of Coalition Affairs has not been effectively 
utilised; its meetings appear too ad hoc and infrequent to have meaningful impact. 
108. In the absence of an agreement and an effective management committee, the Coalition 
Government runs on the basis of a gentleman’s agreement and general good will of the two 
Principals. Thus when they adopt opposing viewpoints or fail to support each other, 
consequences show in the form of anxiety and tensions which quickly spread across the 
government and Kenyan society in general. 
109. Cohesion is critical for the purpose of transiting smoothly to the referendum on the new 
constitution and into the General Election. It is important that national interests supersede 
individual political interests in order to pull the nation together towards the next election 
and possibly a new dawn if a new constitution is passed at the referendum. Even more 
important is the need of the national leadership to mobilise people to participate effectively 
in both the voter registration exercise and the voting itself. Their support for electronic 
system in registration and voting is require at this very early stage as the country seeks to 
enhance integrity of the voting process. 
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5. AGENDA ITEM 4: LONG-STANDING ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 
 
Introduction 
110. Agenda item 4 identified what were considered the underlying issues that had caused the 
crisis in Kenya and which needed to be addressed because they threaten the existence of 
Kenya as a nation. Agenda Item 4 was, therefore, designed to provide the framework for 
undertaking comprehensive constitutional and institutional reforms to address the root 
causes of recurrent conflict and create a better, more secure and prosperous nation.    
 
111. Previous reports pointed out that perceptible headway has been made with respect to certain 
aspects of agenda item 4. There have been accomplishments in some areas but the pace of 
reforms has been too slow to have significant impact. The reports underlined the need to 
speed up reform because the slow pace had disillusioned the public. 
 
112. The long-standing issues identified under Agenda Item 4 were: 
• Undertaking constitutional, legal and institutional reforms; 
• Undertaking land reforms; 
• Tackling poverty and inequality, and combating regional development imbalances; 
• Tackling unemployment, especially among the youth; 
• Consolidating national cohesion and unity; and 
• Addressing transparency, accountability and impunity. 
 
 Key Findings 
 
Summary of findings 
• Institutional Reforms 
o  PSC deliberations in Naivasha agreed on contentious issues 
o The COE incorporates PSC recommendations into the constitution  
o Parliamentarians retreat at the KIA fails to establish consensus on the 
changes to be made to the draft 
o Proposed Constitution of Kenya is presented to Parliament and debate 
begin 
• TJRC continues to lose credibility amidst pressure on the Chair to resign  
• National Cohesion and Integration Commission begins its work, which is 
positively perceived 
Constitutional and institutional reforms 
113. Constitution review on fast track: During this review period, January to March, 2010, a 
number of important milestones in the constitutional review process were achieved. First, 
the PSC deliberations in Naivasha in January resolved several issues in the draft, which the 
Committee of Experts (CoE) had identified as contentious. Second, the CoE revised the PSC 
recommendations and finalized the drafting of the Proposed Constitution of Kenya, which 
they handed over to the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC). It was tabled in Parliament 
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on 2 March 2010. Parliament began debating on the draft from 23 March 2010.   
 
114. The CoE and the PSC synergised their work: The completion of the Proposed Constitution 
of Kenya was an important step in the constitutional review process because the draft 
comprises, firstly, the revisions of the Harmonized Draft and the publics’ views on it, as 
incorporated by the CoE, and, secondly, the Parliamentary Select Committee views 
presented in their meeting at Naivasha. The draft has been produced without acrimony 
between the CoE and the PSC. It is worth noting that, in the past, the PSC and parliament 
itself have always been major hurdles in the review process. Scaling these hindrances implies 
passing important obstacles in the review process. 
 
115. The public now believes that a new constitution is imminent: People’s enthusiasm for a new 
constitution remained quite high. Only 33 per cent think that the Coalition Government is 
unlikely to make a new constitution this year while 59 per cent think it is likely that the 
Government will make a new constitution. Only about 7 per cent do not know whether this is 
likely or unlikely.  
 
116. Voter turn out in the referendum is likely to be high: In the survey, when asked, ‘if a new 
constitution referendum is held this year, will you turn out to vote’, as many as 80 per cent 
said they will vote; 16 per cent will not vote, while 4 per cent per cent do not know whether 
or not they will vote.  
 
Figure 10: If a constitution referendum is held this year, will you turn out to vote? 
 
 
117. In the February survey, 65 per cent of those who said they will vote in the referendum will 
vote in favour of a new constitution. Only 10 per cent will be against the new constitution 
while 23 per cent are not sure.  
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Figure 11: If you will vote in the referendum, do you think you will  
vote in favour or against the draft constitution? 
 
 
118.  About 10 per cent of those who said they feel close to a particular party will vote against a 
new constitution. More people in ODM would vote for a new constitution than in PNU. 
Those unsure are about the same – between 14 and 16 per cent. 
Table 14: Regardless of your party position on the draft constitution, will you…? 
 Total PNU ODM 
Vote in favour of the new 
constitution 62% 58% 69% 
Against the new constitution 10% 11% 8% 
Unsure 16% 16% 14% 
I will not vote 6% 8% 5% 
RTA 0% 0% 0% 
DK 4% 5% 2% 
Refused 2% 2% 2% 
  100% 100% 100% 
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Figure 12 : Regardless of your party’s position on the harmonised draft, will you… 
 
 
 
119. Ethnic, sectarian and individual interests prevent consensus on amendments. Prior to 
starting formal deliberations on the draft constitution in Parliament, the House adjourned 
for a week on 17 February 2010, and went on a retreat at the Kenya Institute of 
Administration (KIA) in Lower Kabete, to caucus and build consensus on the draft 
constitution before debates in Parliament. The KIA retreat failed to agree on any key 
amendments to the constitution owing to inter- and intra-party difference; regional, 
sectarian, ethnic and personal interests. These differences later shaped discussions on the 
draft constitution resulting in MPs’ failure to agree on what to amend.  
 
120. The review has passed traditional obstacles and hurdles: So far, the review process has 
passed the initial hurdles, which have hitherto been the PSC and the Parliament itself. 
Surmounting these obstacles was not necessarily because of the good-will of these organs 
but rather the result of the legal framework governing the review process. It is this 
framework that has secured the process from political mischief. The law sought to fill 
loopholes previously exploited, politically technically, to prevent completion of constitution 
review. Some of these include the requirement that any amendment of the proposed draft 
should enjoy support of 145 MPs out of a total of 222 Mps. And even if the amendment were 
to get the required support, the CoE would finally determine the relevance of the 
amendment. Further, if there are disagreements between the Parliament and the CoE, then 
the reference groups would be called to facilitate a consensus. Any disagreement between the 
COE and the National Assembly would only be resolved through by involving the reference 
group. 
 
121. Ethnic divisions have reduced; sectarian interests are filling the gap: In the past, 
differences over a new constitution centred on the perceptions and actions of various ethno-
regional interests mobilised for or against a position. At present, however, the main 
disagreements are sectarian. Sections of the Christian Church are yet to show support to the 
draft; they are opposed to the draft on account of a number of contentious issues that the 
draft did not address. Be that as it may, one may argue that this is a positive development 
since the differences are over issues rather than narrow ethnic persuasions. It is possible 
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that the main conflict will be one between political and some church leaders. However, it is 
also worth noting that the debate on some of these issues has distracted attention away from 
what has always been the focus of debates on a new constitution: reforming the state and its 
institutions. The church itself has been at the forefront of this campaign for comprehensive 
reforms. It is ironic therefore that the church is likely to be seen by some as a new hurdle in 
this process. 
 
Challenges ahead  
122. Contentious issues arousing sectarian divisions: The review process is challenged by an 
inability to resolve some of the contentious issues. Sometimes such issues are resolved but 
reappear depending on new interests and perspectives. They become new sources of tension 
and further polarization. Thus, while the Kadhi courts and the provisions on the right to life 
appear to have been discussed at different stages, they re-emerged as new sources of 
dissension. Similarly, devolution appears to be contentious. As noted above, regional, 
individual political interests, and sectarian interests are some of the obstacles, at different 
times depending on the interests presented. The land issue is also another source of 
controversy. These are simply a reflection of the complexity of the long-standing issues that 
remain unaddressed. 
 
123. Continued vigilance will be necessary to prevent efforts to derail the process: These 
interests have so far not derailed the review process. This is not to suggest that the review 
will move to the referendum smoothly. These interests may coalesce around a single issue 
and prevent the review from moving forward. There are only a few months to the 
referendum; there is need to continuously monitor the evolving dynamics and identify 
suitable strategies for addressing them. This calls for vigilance from all the stakeholders. 
124. Heightened level of disharmony: As noted above, recent political developments have 
heightened the level of disharmony between the two principals; between the main political 
parties ODM and PNU; and, within their members and supporters. This disharmony is the 
biggest threat to the finalisation of the review process.63 Indeed, the successful completion of 
the remaining part of the constitutional review process hinges a lot on the extent to which 
these tensions will be kept out of the public view.  
 
125. Continued threats from ‘single-issue’ groups: Since the constitutional review began, the 
process has been under constant threat from a number of single-issue groups that peg their 
support for the new constitution on the presence or absence of certain clauses. Some Church 
leaders have  always threatened to campaign against the new constitution over perceived 
issues of abortion and the retention of the Kadhi Courts. These are generally presented as 
contentious but with different dimensions because if concessions are made, other groups are 
likely to rise up citing the need for new amendments. To prevent these demands from 
derailing the progress made this far, there is need to establish a dispute resolution 
mechanism, which will devise strategies for addressing the issues raised.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS: THE JUDICIARY 
 
126. The judiciary is yet to fully embrace performance contracting in line with new public sector 
management approaches. Inadequate administrative facilities and understaffing continue to 
                                                 
63 NCSC Press Briefing on Friday February 19, 2010, entitled: Political Altercation the Biggest Threat to New 
Constitutional Order”. 
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hamper the delivery of justice. Currently, the Judiciary has vacancies for 24 judges. The 
High court is the most affected by understaffing; the court is required to have a total of 70 
judges but has only 46.64  
 
127. There are no substantive policy and institutional reforms that have taken place in the 
judiciary since 2008. But there are several and significant initiatives undertaken within the 
judiciary which lay a framework for judicial reforms. The Judiciary is installing information 
communication technology in all judicial departments across the country. The installation of 
video conferencing equipment will enable magistrates to handle prison cases from their 
offices. This will expedite the hearing of cases, enhance security and save transportation 
expenses. 65 
 
128. The report on the Taskforce on Judicial Reforms is also finalised. A team was also 
constituted to incorporate views from the partners in the Coalition Government and other 
stakeholders, and harmonise the draft with the proposed new constitution66. The proposed 
new constitution itself contains a number of judicial reforms and it is expected that 
substantive reforms will be undertaken once the new constitution comes into effect.67 And if 
not, the recommendations by the Taskforce are substantive enough to transform, positively, 
the judiciary. 
 
Institutional reforms: the police 
 
129. Implementation committee is working: A Police Reforms Implementation Committee was 
formed on 12 January 2010. The 15-man team has been developing a framework to 
operationalise the recommendations of the Police Taskforce. The Committee has set up 
various work groups that have already identified action points and a framework for 
operation. It is certain that the implementation of the Task Force Report (Ransley report) 
would have far-reaching effects on the police force as an institution. Similarly, the proposed 
constitution provides for comprehensive policy, administrative and institutional changes. 
However, a point of concern, however, is that, to date, the police reform has been limited to 
only reshuffling of personnel. As noted above, the failure to reform the police before the next 
general election is an issue of concern. There is an urgent need to prioritise reforms in the 
police to ensure that the force is comprehensively reformed in terms of attitude, behaviour 
and capacity well before the next general election. 
 
LAND REFORMS 
 
130. The National Land Policy was approved by the Cabinet and passed in Parliament. However, 
its implementation is yet to start. Powerful landowners are likely to put pressure on powerful 
politicians to delay implementation pending the result of the referendum.68  
 
131. Reforms at the Ministry of lands – automation of records: A number of important 
administrative reforms are being implemented at the Ministry of Lands. The Ministry is, for 
example, implementing an automated land rent integrated system expected to be 
operational from June 1, 2010.  Once this is complete, Kenyans will be able know the status 
                                                 
64 Interview with a senior official, Judiciary, 17 February 2010. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid 
67 Interview with an MP  17 February 2010.  
68 Interview with, Kenya Land Alliance . See also interview with KHRC  
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of land related issues with ease including by use of cell phone. However, the full roll out 
which would see the whole ministry and all districts across the country become fully ICT 
complaint is likely to take the next six years. 69  
 
132. Updating boundaries and maps: Land surveyors were moving round the country to 
demarcate disputed boundaries afresh. There are plans to also review and update the 
country’s maps, which have not been updated for the last 30 years. This updating of maps is 
supposed to be done every ten years to include new developments such as schools, towns, 
hospitals and roads. 70  
 
133. Cancellation of titles for irregularly acquired land: The Ministry embarked on cancellation 
of title deeds where land earmarked for public utility purposes was irregularly allocated. 71 
Overall, this marks a key step to deal with illegal acquisition of land and is an important 
entry point towards implementing recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Illegal/Irregular Land Allocations (Ndung’u report). However, critics argue that the 
Government has not disclosed the actual numbers on repossessed land parcels or 
surrendered titles, thereby raising concerns about the transparency of the whole process.72 
Given the significance and accomplishment of these steps by the Ministry, there should be 
systematic dissemination of information and public education. This will reduce the 
opportunities for manipulation by politically powerful land grabbers keen to avoid the 
spotlight. 
 
134. Developments in rehabilitation of the Mau Forest: The Government has completed both 
Phase I and II of the Mau Forest rehabilitation, where a total of 21 000 hectares of forest 
land have been recovered.  Preparations for phase three of the repossession and restoration 
of the Mau Forests Complex have also been completed. Phase III entails the recovery of 
titled forestland in Maasai Mau trust land forest.73  Implementation of the national land 
policy should be swift as it will address redistributive justice, thus safeguarding access to a 
means of production which continues to be critical for many Kenyans.74 
 
POVERTY INEQUALITY AND REGIONAL IMBALANCES 
 
135. The September 2009 report noted that the Government had undertaken a number of 
initiatives to address issues of poverty, inequality and regional imbalance. The government 
launched the National Economic Stimulus Program seeking to boost economic recovery and 
return the economy to the envisioned midterm growth path. To ensure food security, billions 
of shillings were allocated to irrigation schemes and agricultural projects to boost food 
production.  
 
136. Food production during this period increased but the capacity to handle this growth appears 
inadequate.  Milk production for instance went to waste for a while in February and March 
                                                 
69 Interview with a senior official, Land Reforms Transformation Unit on 11February 2010. 
70 Ibid. 
71 See ministry of lands press statement dated 11 February 2010 
72 Statements a former Commissioner, the Commission on Illegal and Irregular allocation of public land (Ndungu 
Land Commission), made at the KACC – LSK Ethics and anti corruption workshop on 25th and 26th Feb. 2010 at 
the panari hotel. Nairobi 
73 Press statement, office of the prime minister, Mau Forest Interim coordinating secretariat dated 4 February 2010 
74 Statements, Kenya Land Alliance, made at the KACC – LSK Ethics and anti corruption workshop on 25th and 26th 
Feb. 2010 at the Panari hotel. Nairobi 
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because of limited processing capacity in the country.  Already there are reports that maize 
and other crops are rotting in farms and at homes because of insufficient storage facilities. 
Improving the capacity of the various institutions is critical in this respect.75  
 
137. The last report also noted that the cabinet had approved Ksh 250 billion for development of 
regional authorities for the next 8 years under the ministry of regional development. As part 
of setting the pace for this rollout, the Ministry of Regional Development launched its 
strategic plan for the period 2008 – 2012 on 12th February 2010. In line with the ministry’s 
mandate, vision 2030 and the first medium term plan, the ministry will implement five 
development programmes to enhance integrated regional development and improve 
institutional capacity. It is expected that this will lead to creation of 213,000 to 956,000 
direct and indirect jobs.76 While these are ambitious targets, there is need for the Ministry to 
relate these to both vision 2030 and the devolved institutions under the proposed new 
constitution because if the draft passes the referendum, it will create new institutions or 
even alter the boundaries on which these proposes are anchored. 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE YOUTH 
 
138. The President signed into law the National Youth Council Act which provides for the 
establishment of a youth council to empower young people. The council will coordinate 
youth empowerment activities and mobilize resources to support and fund youth 
programs.77 The president further launched The Youth Empowerment Summit on March 2, 
2010 through the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. The Summit brought together 
leaders from government, education, business as well as faith and community based 
organizations. The summit aimed at identifying barriers to youth employment and made 
actionable commitments to implementing solutions to youth empowerment in the country.78 
 
139. Kazi kwa vijana is not a comprehensive solution; it is only a temporary measure: The Kazi 
kwa Vijana programme was meant to be a short-term six month project. However, when 
money was made available for the project in November 2009, the program was revived to 
extend beyond June 2010. The World Bank has provided US$ 60 million, US$ 43 million of 
which will go towards the sustenance of the KKV program for the next four years. Another 
US$ 15.5 million of the World Bank funds will be administered through KEPSA towards a 
youth internship program, while the balance will go to the Ministry of Youth Affairs to help 
build their capacity.79 
 
140. These initiatives have not addressed youth unemployment. Moreover, allegations of 
embezzlement of funds provided for Kazi kwa Vijana activities are yet to be fully 
investigated. Youth employment, therefore, still remains the biggest problem resulting in 
heightened crime levels and formations of illegal gangs in most parts of the country. In other 
countries such as China, India, Malaysia and Singapore, the youth bulge has been managed 
through skills upgrading by training institutions, vocational schools, internships etc. to 
ensure youth are not idle.80 This suggests that a more comprehensive policy of addressing 
                                                 
75 Interview with senior official the ministry of planning and national development on 23 February 2010. 
76 Ministry of Regional Development authorities. http://www.regional-dev.go.ke/ 
77 Interview with a programme Officer at the Youth Agenda On 22 February 2010. 
78 See http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/march2010/2010020301.htm. accessed on 30 march 2010 
79 ibid 
80 Interview with a senior officer, ministry of planning and national development on 23 February 2010. 
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the youth problem should be developed. Kazi kwa Vijana is not a comprehensive solution; it 
is a temporary measure that is not sustainable. 
 
CONSOLIDATING NATIONAL COHESION AND UNITY 
 
141. TJRC losing credibility: The TJRC has continued to face credibility challenges, especially 
concerning its Chair. Challenges are based on pressure for the Chairman to resign because of 
perceived conflicts of interest based on his association with, or knowledge about, matters 
that are likely to come before the commission81. This period saw increased pressure both, 
local and international, and from within the commission, to have the Chair resign to enable 
the Commission to proceed with its work, which the Chairman has strongly resisted. The 
matter is assuming ethnic and politicised dimensions. Those supporting the Chair observe 
that he is targeted on an ethnic basis, or by undisclosed sectarian interests, and threaten to 
boycott the TJRC process if he resigns. Despite these problems, by early February, about half 
of the survey respondents were confident that the institution will deliver on resolving past 
violations, investigating past abuses and promoting healing and reconciliation. But not many 
are confident that the institution will investigate past abuses of office by public officials. 
These figures suggest a need for TJRC to urgently address its credibility crisis.  
 
Table 15: How confident are you that the TJRC will… 
 
August 
‘09    
January 
‘10    
 Very confident Confident 
Not 
confident DK 
Very 
confident Confident 
Not 
confident DK 
Resolve past violations 
of human rights 
 
9% 
 
38% 
 
40% 
 
13% 14% 45% 34% 7% 
Promote peace and 
national unity 
 
15% 
 
43% 
 
30% 
 
12% 19% 48% 26% 7% 
Investigate past abuses 
of office by public 
officials 
 
10% 
 
31% 
 
44% 
 
14% 13% 39% 40% 8% 
Promote healing and 
reconciliation among 
Kenyans 
 
14% 
 
41% 
 
33% 
 
12% 19% 47% 26% 8% 
Identify those involved 
in past violations82 
 
10% 
 
31% 
 
45% 
 
14% 12% 35% 43% 9% 
 
National cohesion and integration commission 
 
142. The cohesion commission began its work emphasising that it plans to foster cohesion in the 
country through civic education. The commission will also investigate and advise the 
government on addressing the inequalities that exist in the country at various levels, 
including ethnic inequalities, and also monitor income and job distribution. 83 
 
143. The NCIC has taken an unusual path to reconciliation, by addressing ethnicity, particularly 
                                                 
81
 See for example statements by CSOs     
82
 Asked only in August survey. 
83 Interview with a Commissioner , National Cohesion and Integration Commission on 17 February 2010 
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in employment. So far the Commission has summoned only some senior government 
officers to explain ethnic inequalities in their departments. On the whole, paying attention to 
ethnic inequalities is an important approach to examining the factors that prevent national 
cohesion. In light of this, the legislation on equal opportunities and equality should be 
enacted. This was proposed in 2009 but is yet to be enacted. 
 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
144. New laws to fight corruption: President Kibaki signed into law The Proceeds of Crime and 
Anti Money Laundering Act and the Arbitration (amendment) Act. The law provides for 
seizure of property of those found guilty.  
 
145. Fight against corruption: During this period, the government convened a meeting of 
Permanent Secretaries, chief executives of parastatals, and provincial commissioners on 5 
February 2010 to discuss strategies to fight corruption.  The meeting was intended to give 
new impetus to the fight against corruption and restate the government’s position on zero 
tolerance on corruption.84 The government also announced renewed commitment to the 
fight against corruption by instructing that action be taken immediately on all audit 
reports.85 
 
146. These measures are procedural; they are not focused on action even though the challenge is 
to punish or prosecute and convict those involved in high-level corruption. The preceding 
section noted that political expediency prevents the government from taking action on 
politicians involved in high-level corruption; senior politicians are not held accountable. 
Generally the public remains sceptical that the Coalition Government will fight corruption. 
The public has more faith in the international community to act in this respect.  
 
Table 16: Do you think it is likely that the following institutions will fight against corruption in 
Kenya: 
 
December 
‘08   
August 
‘09   
January 
‘10   
  Likely Unlikely 
Don’t 
know Likely Unlikely 
Don’t 
know Likely Unlikely 
Don’t 
know 
Coalition 
Government 47% 52% 1% 29% 69% 2% 41% 58% 1% 
Political 
parties 26% 73% 1% 21% 76% 2% 28% 70% 1% 
Civil society 52% 45% 3% 47% 45% 8% 56% 40% 3% 
Place of 
worship 75% 23% 2% 72% 25% 2% 69% 29% 1% 
Kenya Anti-
Corruption 
Commission  57% 41% 2% 46% 49% 4% 49% 47% 3% 
Media -- -- -- 80% 17% 3% 78% 20% 1% 
Private -- -- -- 51% 38% 10% 57% 37% 6% 
                                                 
84 See http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/. Speech by President Kibaki during a workshop for permanent 
secretaries, accounting officers and chief executives of state corporations on strategies to fight or eliminate 
corruption the public service on 5th Feb. 2010. Accessed 2/10/2010 
85 See http:// www.communication.go.ke/ - Accessed on 2/23/2010. Published by Office of the government 
spokesman. 
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Sector 
International 
Community -- -- -- 69% 25% 6% 66% 29% 4% 
Attorney 
General -- -- -- -- -- -- 24% 70% 6% 
 
147. Many Kenyans also attribute corruption to income inequalities. As many as 78 per cent 
attributed corruption to income differences in December 2008. The number increased to 85 
per cent and 86 per cent, respectively, both August 2009 and January 2010. 
 
Table 17: Are differences in income responsible for any of the following: 
 
December 
‘08   
August 
‘09   
January 
‘10   
 Yes No 
Don’t 
know Yes No 
Don’t 
know Yes No 
Don’t 
know 
Crime 77% 22% 1% 80% 17% 3% 85% 13% 2% 
Hatred between 
groups 59% 38% 3% 76% 21% 3% 76% 21% 3% 
Corruption 78% 20% 2% 85% 12% 3% 86% 12% 2% 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
148. The report notes remarkable developments in the constitutional review process. The PSC 
reached an agreement on the harmonized draft constitution and presented the draft to 
parliament. The draft is at a critical state where the need for consensus is paramount to 
avoid divisions that could derail the process when the draft reaches the referendum stage.  
 
149. The political will to implement constitutional reform seems to have been achieved and 
should be maintained as the referendum approaches. However, the Coalition Government 
continued to be plagued with numerous allegations of serious corruption, which raises the 
alarm on rampant impunity. Agents of impunity are likely to mobilise against any reform 
that threatens their interests. The constitutional review is not an exception in this context. 
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6.  GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
150. The report has highlighted a number of conclusions in the various sections and 
corresponding to the agenda items of the KNDR Agreements. This part of the reports re-
emphasises the main ones. It suffices to mention that the opportunity for making hard 
decisions is threatened with closure as the country moves nearer to the referendum date and 
to the 2012 general elections.  
151. The public is generally supportive of prosecution of leaders of illegal groups and perpetrators 
of post-election violence. The public is also supportive of any measures that can hold people 
accountable and end all forms of impunity including corruption. In this regard, people are 
generally supportive of the ICC intervention. Unfortunately, the ICC intervention has meant 
increased threats for witnesses. Deaths, threats and intimidation of potential witnesses have 
occasioned a need for witnesses to hide. Without a functional witnesses protection 
programme, not many witnesses will be willing to give evidence. A programme under the 
watch of human rights defenders and the international community/organisations is an 
imperative. 
152. The problems facing IDPs are yet to be fully addressed. Unfortunately, the IDP problem has 
receded in significance; A few people seem to be articulating their plight to ensure they 
remain a national priority. It is important that a rights based approach be used in addressing 
their problems; participation of IDPs, openness and a high sense of accountability should be 
the guiding principles in resolving their problems. Related to this is also the problem of 
healing and reconciliation. This period notes improvement in terms the extent to which 
people accommodates others. Survey findings show that people are gradually getting a long 
with other communities.  
153. Lack of coherence within the Coalition Government remains a sticking point. Without a clear 
mechanism for resolving disputes as well as absence of a framework to guide how the parties 
would operate within the coalition, the running of coalition is dependent on ‘gentleman 
agreement’ and the good will of the two Principals. In the absence of structured mechanisms 
for consultations, partisan interests are increasingly undermining the making of decisions 
within the coalition and are preventing promotion of greater interests of the nation. 
Informing these differences is the unresolved issue of power sharing. There are still 
disagreements on who has what power and whether power should be shared equally. 
Discussions are no longer about national good and interests. It is not recognised that power 
sharing is about helping both parties to unite in purpose – reforms for the country.  
154. A number of initiatives under agenda item 4 have been undertaken. The institutional 
infrastructure for reform is much in place in several areas. But there are certainly some 
important reforms that should have been undertaken but have not. Critical among these are 
the comprehensive police and judicial reforms. Their respective taskforces have made 
important recommendations and some activities have begun in earnest. Implementation of 
these recommendations will lead to clear institutional and policy transformation in these 
institutions. The proposed new constitution, however, if implemented will open a new 
window to undertake even more far reaching changes in these and other public sector 
institutions. Indeed the new constitution opens a window and opportunities to transform the 
state and its institutions. But the focus on single issues is distracting attention away from 
what has always been the focus of the debate on a new constitution: reforming the state and 
its institutions as well as the society itself. 
